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Developmentof Term Lending
BECAUSE THE FORCES THAT brought about the emergence of
term lending about 1933 are almost inextricably connected
with the factors that nourished its growth during ensuing
years, it would be illogical to separate the problems of origin
and development. An accurate view of the major processes
at work in the business credit market since 1933 may be
achieved by grouping the numerous events bearing on term
lending into the following categories:
1. Factors causing a relative growth in the demand by
American business enterprises for medium-term credit, and
especially for term loans as opposed to short- or long-dated
loans or equity capital.
2. Factors relatively reducing the incomes that lending or
investing agencies could obtain, for any degree of risk as-
sumption, by extending credits of other types than term
loans.
3. Changes in public regulation and supervision of lending
agencies of a nature that permitted them to enter the field
of medium-term business credit with more assurance.
Obviously the first group of factors concerns the demand
side of the market while the second and third relate to the
supply of business credit.
Relative Growth in Demand
for Medium-Term Business Credit Since 1933
The evidence points to the conclusion that at least since 1933
there has been a relative shift of demand by business enter-
prises from equity financing to debt financing, as a result of the
relatively unfavorable terms on which common stocks and, to a
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lesser degree, preferred stocks could be sold. The preference
for creditorship that developed in the United States following
1929 has served to increase the percentage spread between
yields of common stocks and yields' of high-grade bonds far
beyond previous American experience or that of the indus-
trialized nations of Europe.1 Unquestionably this is one of
the influences behind recent changes in the ways in which busi-
ness is financed. Entrepreneurs themselves undoubtedly pre-
ferred to avoid debt and were willing to offer sizable premiums
to purchasers of equity securities, but the comparatively large
disadvantages of procuring funds by selling equities as against
contracting loans worked to overcome this preference.
Apart from this basic tendency to shift from equity to debt
financing, strong economic and institutional forces have been
in operation to increase, both in form and in fact, entrepre-
ñeurial preferences for medium-term debt. The protracted in-
dustrial revival which (with occasional interruptions) de-
veloped after 1932 found many concerns with deteriorated
plant and equipment and in a straitened working capital posi-
tion as a result of the operating losses experienced during
the downswing. These concerns required additional funds, and
a majority found it advantageous to borrow them. At the
same time, businessmen were vividly aware of the pressure
that had been put upon them by commercial banks during the
contraction period of 1929-32 to liquidate their short-term
obligations. As arulethesecreditsoriginally had been
extended with a realization by both banker and business execu-
tive that the funds would be used to finance industrial opera-
tions of a type that would not conveniently permit of com-
plete liquidation at their legal dates of maturity. The runs
on banks during the banking crisis compelled bank manage-
ments to convert assets into cash at as rapid a rate as possi-
1See,for example, the treatment of this phenomenon in G. Coim and F.
Lehmann, Economic Consequences of Recent American Tax Policy (Supplement
I of Social Research, 1938) and by Albert G. Hart in his remarks before the
annual conference of the American Statistical Association, Chicago, December
1940. A. Wilfred May has given a provocative analysis of the salient facts in
his article entitled "American and European Valuations of Equity Capital," in
American Economic Review (December 1939).Development of Term Lending 17
ble, even at the cost of severe embarrassment or insolvency
of their business debtors.
It is therefore understandable that the business community
faced the 1933-37 period of upswing with a desire to avoid
the short-term commitments that had only recently wrought
such difficulties for them. There was an expanded demand
for credit, but not for the traditional form of short-term
banking credit.2 In short, the great depression following 1929
heightened the weaknesses latent in the old business credit
forms. Term loans developed partly in recognition of the need
for rewriting credit terms to conform more closely to the
economic nature of the underlying business transactions, thus
protecting the economy from the shock of sudden enforce-
ment of unsuitable credit terms.
The rejuvenated demand for money to modernize, re-
organize or renovate plant and equipment and to finance ex-
panding productive activities, taken together with the aversion
of business management for short-dated bank loans, would
normally have caused an increase in the demand for credit
from investment bankers. In the absence of other forces, this
would have led to an increase in the quantity of publicly
offered corporate bonds and debentures. But to a significant
degree the expanding credit demand was prevented from
expressing itself in that form. One cause was regulation of the
securities markets imposed by the Securities Act of 1933. This
law placed considerable burdens upon issuers, underwriters,
and experts particpiating in the preparation of registration
2 One manifestation of this attitude is the effort exerted by businessmanage-
ment to minimize the amount of short-term debt revealed on balance sheets.
In accordance with accepted accounting practices only debts due in less than
one year need be carried in the "current liabilities" section of the balance sheet,
other indebtedness being grouped with "capital" items. Trade suppliers as well
as financial institutions usually give great weight to the "current" position of
a business in judging its credit. Consequently, one ancillary cause of the increase
in demand for term loans, as opposed to traditional short-term banking credits,
has been the fact that the term borrower need show those instalments of
the loan that are due within one year as a "current" liability. This factor has
also exerted some influence on methods of accounts receivable financing during
recent years. See forthcoming publication of the National Bureau of Economic
Research (Financial Research Program), Accounts Recei'vable Financing, by
Raymond J. Saulnier and Neil H. Jacoby.18 Term Lending to Business
statements and prospectuses. The expenses of securing elab-
orate data and of preparing and filing registration statements
were large. Combined, they greatly increased the costs of ob-
taining credit from the public through investment bankers,
especially for those issues of less than $10 million which
account for the largest amount of term loans made by com-
mercial banks.3 From the point of view of social welfare these
costs may have been wisely imposed. Despite them, there was
a considerable expansion in the amount of corporate debt
securities underwritten after 1933. Nonetheless, the Act chan-
nelized some part of the demand for business credit away from
public issues, and directed it •toward loans that could be ne-
gotiated without the comparatively high costs and relative
inflexibility of public flotation. The term loan was well adapted
to meet this changed demand, as was the private placement
of securities by issuers directly with investing institutions.4
Business concerns securing funds through private sales of
debt securities(instead of public offerings)eliminate or
reduce a number of expenses in addition to costs of registra-
tion under the Securities Act. Among the savings are under-
writers' commissions (unless fees are paid third parties for
bringing issuers and purchasers together), costs of advertis-
ing, costs of printing registration statements and prospectuses,
outlays for engraving certificates, transfer taxes, costs of listing
issues on securities exchanges, and costs of maintaining facili-
ties for transferring securities. Greater speed in financing and
more expeditious modification of loan indentures to meet
changed circumstances of borrowers are additional, and im-
The cost of flotation for underwritten bond issues during 1938-39 dropped
consistently from 7.5 percent for issues under $1 million to 3.4 percent for is-
sues of from $1 million to $5 million, to 2.8 percent for issues of from $5 million
to $20 million, and to 2.4percentfor issues of $20 million and over. See Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, Cost of Flotation for Registered Securities,
1938-1939 (Washington, 1941)p.4.
Purchase of corporate securities directly from issuers without registration
has been estimated to comprise 44 percent of the total dollar amount of domestic
and foreign corporate issues during 1940. See House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 77th Congress, 1st Session, Hearings on H.R. 4344,
H.R. 5065 and H.R. 5832 (Washington, 1941) Part II, p. 366. However, it is
likely that term loans of substantial amount are included in the "direct pur-
chases" upon which the percentage is based. See p. 528.Development of Term Lending 19
portant, advantages of private placements and term loans over
public offerings of securities.5 Finally, the issuing corporation
avoids public disclosure of corporate affairs, and its directors
escape potential civil liabilities under the Securities Act. It is
not unlikely that these factors are even more important than
the cost of public offerings of securities in explaining the
growth of term lending and direct financing.
The major disadvantage of a private placement, from the
point of view of an issuing concern, is lack of broad market-
ability. This precludes the occasional repurchase of securities
at advantageous prices in the open market. However, lack of
marketability is not a critical disadvantage to the institution
holding a private placement. It appears that the SEC will
permit a holder subsequently to dispose of such an issue with-
out registration, providing disposition is not made to so many
buyers as to constitute a public offering, and does not occur
so soon after private purchase as to deprive the issue of the
character of an "investment" by the reselling jflStjtUtjOfl.6
In fact, in order to provide for the contingency of resale, the
formal features of marketability are generally preserved in
an issue privately placed, such as provision for exchange of
engraved bonds of smaller denomination for the bonds of
lurger denomination given at time of original purchase, and
provision for registration of the issue on securities exchanges
under certain conditions. A broader consideration is that the
merit which public marketability has possessed, both to issuers
and purchasers of corporate securities, has become steadily
less through time as a result of "thinner" securities markets
and the institutionalization of the investment process.
A number of other forces came into play during or after
Churchill Rodgers, "Purchase by Life Insurance Companies of Securities
Privately Offered," Harvard Law Review, Vol. LII, No. 5 (March 1939).
°DuringJune 194-1, Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States
purchased $35,393,000 of first mortgage 33/i percent bonds due 1971 of the New
York State Electric and Gas Corporation. Less than four months later, on
September 22, 1941, Equitable sold a blook of $10,000,000 of this issue to "not
more than twenty other institutional investors" through Salomon Brothers and
Hutzler, as agents. See New York Times, September 23, 1941.20 TermLending to Business
1933 that have tended to increase the demand for medium-
term credit. These included the following:
1. The sharp decline in interest rates has resulted in much
term borrowing from commercial banks to refund outstand-
ing bonds or debentures sold during past years when much
higher interest rates obtained. Many industrial concerns sold
long-term debt securities during the 1920's to yield 5 to 8
percent per annum, and were able to pay them off with the
proceeds of term loans contracted at from 2 to 4 percent per
annum. The quantitative importance of this factor isindi-
cated by the evidence that a third of the number of term
loans, accounting for more than half of the amount of term
credit, have been used solely by borrowers for repayment of
debt or retirement of preferred stocks. Since the incentive
for such term borrowing will partially disappear when in-
terest rates stop falling, refunding is a less reliable basis for
a continued high volume of term lending than is the acquisi-
tion by business of new fixed or working capital. But refund-
ing consistently played a role from 1933 through 1940.
2. The growing weight of corporate taxation has reduced
net income available for the internal financing of expansion
and has made it increasingly difficult for borrowers to dis-
charge outstanding debt according to original schedule. The
rates of the Federal tax on corporate net income have risen
substantially since 1933. Surtaxes on undistributed net in-
comes were effective during 1936 and 1937.Beginningin
1940, taxes were laid on "excess profits" in an effort to pre-
vent the high level of industrial activity generated by the
national defense effort from producing large business profits.
The combined effect of these levies has been to cause expanding
businesses to seek term loans, and to compel indebted busi-
nesses to use money procured from term borrowing to refund
debts that could not be canceled through the application of
retained profits. Many concerns have, therefore, not only
sought term credit, but have experienced a decline in their
ability to get out of debt. Business taxation is an influenceReduction in Returns Obtainable
by Banks from Investment in Alternative Media
On the supply side of the business credit market, the salient
question to be answered is: What factors caused business
financing agencies, especially commercial banks, to be able and
willing to meet the demands for term loans that expanded
so rapidly after 1933? The answer is to be found, first, in
the increase in funds in the hands of commercial banks and
other investing institutions, not investible in alternative assets
with yields as attractive as those of term loans; and second,
in the actions of public financing agencies and regulatory bodies
that enabled private credit-granting agencies to enter the
field of term credits with more assurance.
Underlying the expansion in the supply of term credit has
been the phenomenal increase since 1932 in the excess re-
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likely to condition the demand for term loans for many years
to come.
3. Relatively growing labor costs have given impetus to the
installation of labor-saving machinery and equipment or
reorganization of productive facilities, thus increasing the
mand for funds to finance these operations. One result
the labor organization movement that developed
the United States with such strength after 1933
crease in the cost of labor relative to the costs o
ductive factors.7 In many industries, including
paper, and bituminous coal industries, managem















setting higher labor costs or even reducing aver-
of production. Term loans have been pecu-
to finance the acquisition of machinery or the





compute the annual dollar savings accruing therefrom and
to gear the amortization schedule of the loan to these savings.
Theincrease in labor costs
the rise in wage rates. Fully as
slow-downs or shut-downs as a
gerial time devoted to problems
is,of course, measured very incompletely by
important in many instances are the Costs of
result of labor disputes and the cost of mana-
of labor relations.22 TermLending to Business
serves of commercial banks. Since 1934, excess reserves have
rarely been less than $2 billion, except during 1937, and they
rose to well over $6 billion during 1940. This expansion oc-
curred despite substantial increases in legal reserve require-
ments. Investible funds in the hands of life insurance companies
also have grown steadily in this period.
Concurrently with the immense expansion of the supply of
the principal private institu-
loan market, there has been a
of return that these institutions
their funds in other media. Average
s Treasury obligations and of high-
have fallen precipitously since 1933.
by securities have earned only 1 per-




under the Banking Act of 1935. Although personal loans
and consumer instalment financing have provided broadening
avenues for profitable employment of bank funds, the po-
tential magnitude of such uses has not nearly matched the
amount of idle bank funds awaiting employment. All these
factors have swollen the supply of funds available for term
loans.
Facilitating Activities of
Public Credit and Supervisory Agencies
Despite the emergence of broad demands for term loans
after 1933, and a concomitant increase in the ability of com-
mercial banks to meet them, it is improbable that the subse-
quent burst of term lending by commercial banks would have
materialized had there not been inaugurated certain public
institutions and changes in bank supervisory policy. These
greatly increased, if they did not actually create, a willingness
of the commercial banking system to make term loans in vol-
ume. Among them the following factors were significant:
funds available for lending by
tions participating in the term
marked reduction in the rates
could earn by placing
yields of United State
grade corporate bonds
Call loans collateralized
cent per annum for a
has occurred in the demand for loans collateralized
able securities, resulting in part from the increa
requirements imposed by the Federal ReserveDevelopment of Term Lending 23
1. Under several Acts of Congress the ability of member
banks of the Federal Reserve System to obtain cash from
Federal Reserve banks for items in their portfolios was greatly
expanded. In consequence, banks could make loans maturing
in three, five, or more years with less risk of becoming frozen.
After their experiences of 1930-33, when the rush of the pub-
lic to obtain cash had compelled many banks rapidly to liq-
uidate loans and investments upon the best terms they could
get, bankers were exceedingly sensitive to the need for liquidity
in their loans and investments. Moved by the events of these
years, Congress successively broadened the ability of banks
in time of monetary stringency to rediscount or to obtain
advances upon the pledge of banking assets. Without detailing
these changes, itis sufficient to observe that by the end of
1933 member banks could obtain cash for any sound asset
held by them.8 There can be no doubt that this broadening of
the rediscount and advance powers of the Federal Reserve
banks exerted an important although unmeasurable influence
upon commercial banks toward the extension of credits which,
in case of a sudden rush to liquidity by the public, could be
turned into cash by other means than by collection from the
borrowers.
2. The inauguration in 1933 of deposit insurance by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation tended to produce a
similar change in bankers' attitudes toward term loans but for
a different reason.9 It was believed that the existence of in-
surance would minimize the likelihood of widespread and sud-
den runs by depositors for cash. It may be that greater stability
in the deposits of small banks is reflected in greater stability
of their deposits in correspondent banks located in larger
cities. 'Whether or not well founded, this belief of bankers
that deposit insurance increased the stability of deposits would
per se have increased the willingness of banks to make longer
8The legislation accomplishing these reforms includes the following: Act of
February 27, 1932 (47 Stat.56, ch. 58) ;Act of February 3,1933(47 Stat.
794, ch. 34) ; Act of March 9, 1933 (48 Stat. 1, ch. 1); Act of August 23, 1935
(49 Stat. 684, ch. 614).
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term loans, even without the privilege of cashing them at the
Federal Reserve banks in case of need.1° As it was, deposit
insurance fortified the influence of the broadened Reserve
bank credit facilities.
3. The activities of the Federal Reserve banks and of the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation in making term loans
directly to business concerns helped set the stage for action
by private financing agencies in these fields. It would be in-
correct to say that the public agencies originated term lending,
for there is evidence that a number of commercial banks
made term loans prior to June 1934, at which time both Fed-
eral Reserve banks and the RFC were equipped with industrial
loan powers." But indubitably the actions of these agencies
educated many commercial banks in the techniques of making
term loans. They also facilitated the extension of bank term
credits by offering to, and taking from, commercial banks
participations in term loans, and by assuming substantial pro-
portions of the credit risks through the taking of commit-
ments on loans made by private agencies. The quantitative
importance of the Federal Reserve banks and the RFC in
the development of term lending is not adequately measured
by the volume of term loans disbursed relative to those of
commercial banks. Judged only by this standard, their in-
fluence has been comparatively small. Up to the end of 1940
the aggregate volume of business credit disbursed by Federal
Reserve banks and the RFC was in the neighborhood of $300
million, only a small fraction of an indicated term loan volume
10Inpassing, it may be noted that the deposit insurance premium of 1/12
percent per annum of the average amount of deposits held by a bank has be-
come a considerable item of expense, especially to the larger city banks. By
preventing deposits from being costless to banks, the premium has put some
pressure on bankers to translate cash into earning assets, including term loans.
Although itis impossible to evaluate the influence of deposit insurance upon
term lending in quantitative terms, discussion of the subject with many bank
loan officers indicates that this influence has not been negligible in importance.
These powers were granted by the addition of Section 13b of the Federal
Reserve Act, Act of June 19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1105,ch.653), and by the amend-
ment of Section Sd of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation Act, Act of June
19, 1934 (48 Stat. 1108).Development of Term Lending 25
of commercial banks of at least $2.5billionup to that date.12
Yet it is highly probable that the familiarity with medium-
term loans gained by commercial bankers through observa-
tion of, or participation in, term credits extended by the two
public agencies was directly responsible for a very large vol-
ume of term lending on their part.
4. The inauguration of real estate mortgage insurance
during 1934 by the Federal Housing Administration must
also be counted as an influence that tended to expand the
supply of term loan credit.13 Only mortgage loans that con-
formed to the specifications of the FHA were eligible for
insurance. The essential innovation wrought by FHA, in de-
fining credits eligible for insurance, was to substitute a definite
predetermined plan of amortizing a long-term loan for the
former plan of making a medium-term loan without specific
amortization features and with the expectation of renewal.
In short, the FHA was primarily responsible for bringing
about a change in the nature of real estate mortgage credit
parallel in its significance to the adaptation made by com-
mercial banks from the traditional short-term business loan
to the medium-term loan. Since nearly all commercial banks
acquired experience with insured FHA loans after 1934, •there
was undoubtedly some carry-over to the business loan market
of knowledge gained in the real estate mortgage loan market.
Bankers became more acutely aware of the fact that terms
of loans could often be safely extended beyond traditional
limitsif amounts of debts were systematically reduced in
accordance with the income and expenditure pattern of the
borrower.14 Term lending may be as part of a basic
12SeeTable 1 and Appendix A.
13SeeNational Housing Act, approved June 27, 1934. Public, No. 479, 73d
Congress (48 Stat. 1246).
14Somewhatsimilar to the FHA real estate mortgage insurance program in
its effect upon term lending was the provision of Federal ship mortgage insur-
ance by the United States Maritime Commission under the Merchant Marine
Act of 1936, Title XI. Briefly, this permits the Maritime Commission to insure
repayment of a loan secured by a mortgage on a Federal ship which is being
constructed, reconditioned or repaired with the proceeds of the loan. Terms
of such insured mortgage loans may not exceed 20 years. The influence of this
legislation upon private financing of ship construction and repair has been26 Term Lending to Business
transition now occurring in American banking, a transition
whose keystone isthe development of loans made on an
amortization basis, with the borrower looking primarily to the
income received by the debtor for repayment.
5. Revised policies and methods of bank examination have
increased the supply of funds available for term loans. For
some time prior to 1934 the practice was general among
Federal and state supervisory authorities of classifying criti-
cized loans in three categories: "estimated loss," "doubtful,"
and "slow." There is evidence that some bank examiners
habitually classified loans which were not strictly of a seasonal
character as "slow," regardless of their soundness and the
certainty of their ultimate collection. They put pressure on
banks to liquidate slow loans that were outstanding, and dis-
couraged banks from lending to business concerns in any
other way than through the traditional short-term note pay-
able in entirety at maturity.'5 Although a recommendation was
adopted at a joint bank examiners' conference in September
1934 to clarify the slow classification so as to exclude there-
from loans reasonably certain of payment, whatever their ma-
turities, it was not until June 1938 that an agreement was
adopted by the examining agencies to discontinue use of the
slow classification altogether.'6 Commercial bankers have since
scored examiners, in individual cases, for failing to adhere to
the principles of the examination agreement, and for con-
tinuing to criticize capital and other long-term loans per Se,
15Investigatorsof the Secretary of the Treasury reported this condition in
the Seventh Federal Reserve District during 1934, and stated: "There appears
to be sufficient evidence to indicate that the smaller banks have a considerable
fear of examiners and that their lending policies are thereby directly restricted."
Charles 0. Hardy and Jacob Viner, Report on the Availability of Bank Credit
in the Seventh Federal Reserve District, submitted to theSecretary of the
Treasury (Washington, 1935) p. 20.
16SeeFederal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, 1938, pp. 61-64.
comparatively slight up to the present time, mainly because the financing agency
can obtain a contract of insurance only upon a completed ship, and until the
ship is in service the only security of the bank consists of an incomplete ship
plus the performance bond of the construction company. See United States Mari-
time Commission, Federa) Ship Mort9age Insurance under Title XI, Merchant
Marine Act, 1936, As Amended, "Rules and Regulations" (Washington, 1939).Development oJ Term Lending 27
irrespective of the certainty of their ultimate repayment.'7
Nevertheless, 1934 marked a definite pronouncement of policy,
and appears also to have witnessed the beginning of a gradual
change in the operating practices of bank examination, a
change tending to remove adisability under which term
lending had labored.
6. Changes in the public regulation of commercial bank
investments have also affected the, supply of term loans. The
unprecedented decline in market prices of all but the highest-
grade corporate bonds after 1929 led bankers to look with dis-
favor upon bonds and notes of mediocre quality, or upon
small issues of debt securities subject to wide price variations.
This operated to increase their ability to make term loans.
Moreover, accepted bank examination practices in valuing
marketable securities tended to increase their willingness to
do so. Securities were valued at market prices for national
banks up to 1936 and for all state banks up to 1938. Any
deficiency in current market value below cost, at time of ex-
amination, was regarded as "estimated loss" and required to
be written off. This procedure placed the capital position of
a bank subject to the vagaries of changes in interest rates,
speculative fervor, and other erratic influences not always
related to long-term values of security holdings. Especially
was this true of securities not of top quality. Consequently
many bankers came to prefer to extend credit in the form of
term loans, which did not carry the threat of rapid and erratic
revaluation. During 1938 Federal and state supervisory au-
thorities adopted a uniform procedure for valuing securities
which mitigated, but did not entirely remove, the disability
under which security purchases labored as compared with term
loans. Roughly, this procedure called for the valuation of
high-grade securities at cost,'8 and of lower-grade securities
not in default at average market prices during the preceding
eighteen months.
SeeThe Answers of the American Bankers Associalion in reply to a ques-
tionnaire of the U. S. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency (Research
Council, American Bankers Association, New York, April 1941) p. 42.
'8Less amortization of premium, if any.28 TermLending to Business
The expansive effect this action normally would have had
on the volume of bank purchases of corporate securities was,
however, more than offset by the adoption during 1938 of
another regulation regarding commercial bank investments.
As applied in practice by most bank examiners, this regulation
prohibited banks from purchasing corporate securities not
placed in the four highest rating groups by the security rating
sevices. As a result, small concerns which do not find it profita-
ble to market securities publicly and larger enterprises whose
financial circumstances do not earn acceptable ratings for their
securities are precluded from obtaining bank credit through
security issuance. The natural consequence was to increase the
supply of term loan credit to such firms in these classes as
could meet bank credit standards for loans. While essentially
unmeasurable, this influence on the volume of term lending has
undoubtedly been significant. In summary, the net effect of
changes in the regulation of bank investments since 1933 has
undoubtedly been to augment the supply of term loan credit.